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Research results of this indicate very poor performance of a Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) utilizing PDAs. Network throughput is adversely effected most by VPN implementa-
tion and slightly by increased file size. The client distance factor has virtually no effect on the
throughput. The impact of each of these factor levels is small when compared to the magnitude
of the overall mean throughput (≤ 6%). The average network throughput with the PDA client is
much lower than expected (≈ 11,500 bps). This is attributed to several factors with degradation
primarily resulting from limitations of the PDA hardware and O/S. Because of the low throughput
values achieved (regardless if VPN is off or on), an operational WLAN with PDAs (as tested) is
not feasible. Operational use of the network tested would require an in-depth analysis of the type
of network traffic and performance required to maintain functionality. To deploy such a system,
custom designed Winsock controls would need to be implemented to minimize limitations imposed
by the PDA. As PDA technology continues to develop, future hardware and O/S functionality may
provide a more robust platform for network communications. The battery life of the PDA and
jacket battery combination is observed to be about 164 minutes with additional jackets adding
about 99 minutes each.
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PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF A SECURE IEEE 802.11B WIRELESS
NETWORK INCORPORATING PERSONAL DIGITAL ASSISTANTS
I. Introduction
As technology advances and the power of hand-held computing devices increases, the demand
for mobile Wireless Local-Area-Networks (WLANs) has grown. These networks typically consist
of several host desktop computers and can include any number of mobile devices, including laptop
computers and PDAs (Personal Digital Assistant). Desktop computers sometimes serve as stable,
stationary reach back machines providing a connection to larger networks. To maintain connectivity
throughout the range of these devices, a wireless network is necessary. While current laptops provide
performance comparable to that of current desktops, hand-held devices such as PDAs are not nearly
as sophisticated, i.e., they lack the raw processing power and large memories of desktop computers.
Such constraints limit the size and complexity of their software.
Hardware and software are not the only difficult issues involved with wireless network de-
vices. Due to the unguided medium of wireless networks, they are not as reliable as wired networks
transmiting over guided media such as optical fiber or copper wire. More overhead bits are trans-
mitted, routing information is more complex and correction codes are more intricate due to higher
bit error rates caused by increased noise and signal degradation. Transmitted signals may be re-
ceived multiple times because of multipath effects. Therefore, receivers must be robust enough to
effectively distinguish and correct for this. All these effects decrease the efficiency of wireless data
transmission.
Another difficulty encountered in wireless networks is security. The inefficiency of data trans-
mission, limited computing power, and limited battery life of hand-held devices make it challenging
to efficiently implement secure communications. Sending packets through the atmosphere makes
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them available to anyone within range of the transmitter. Since wireless transmissions are so eas-
ily intercepted, a robust security system is absolutely necessary. Traditional complex encryption
software cannot be hosted on PDAs due to limited resources, and the inefficiencies of data transmis-
sion limits the use of long, complex encryptions which increase packet size. While several industry
standards exist for wireless LAN protocols, none of them adequately address security, specifically,
encryption protocols. A Virtual Private Network (VPN) system provides many of these require-
ments in a single package. VPNs provide privacy and security through software hosted on the client
as well as the reachback computer. Recent advances in PDA programming have led to compact
PDA verisions of VPN software [Usk97, Kor98, Ven01, WIASG01, You00, WIASG01].
The Sustainment Logistics Branch (Deployment Sustainment Division, Human Effectiveness
Directorate) of the Air Force Research Laboratory has developed several intelligent agent programs.
One is the Human Interaction with Software Agents (HISA)[MW02]. HISA provides air-traffic
controllers with detailed information about all current planes of interest to the controller. The
software provides information such as flight paths, weather updates, and maximum aircraft on
ground data for target airfields. As a flight progresses, information about the aircraft is regularly
updated. When certain warning criteria are met, the software sends an alert to the controller. For
example, if an aircraft’s projected flight path intersects with another aircraft or weather system, the
controller will be notified and a candidate solution provided. Controllers then decide to accept the
candidate solution or create their own. This software provides a powerful way to track information
in a user-friendly manner for the controller.
Such software is currently only available on desktop computers but there is great operational
potential in putting the software on PDAs. By placing the software on hand-held devices, flight-
line (or otherwise mobile) controllers could monitor vital information and receive updates without
being tied to a desk. Several mobile devices could communicate with a host desktop, regularly
sending and receiving updates. Updates will be bursty in nature. Obviously, the information
1-2
passed during updates is sensitive so broadcasts must be secure. To safely accomplish this, a secure
wireless LAN is necessary. The primary goal of this research it to determine if it is feasible from a
performance perspective for such applications to use secure wireless LAN’s implementing current
wireless protocols and VPN software?
Chapter II reviews current literature on the topic. A background discussion on PDAs, security,
and WLANs is given, as well as a discussion of relevant articles and papers. An overview of the
current state of research in this area is also included, demonstrating the applicability and relevance
of this work.
Research methodology is presented in Chapter III. Specific goals are described and a hypoth-
esis given. The approach for meeting these goals and determining the validity of the hypothesis is
presented as well.
Chapter IV presents the research results. Detailed accounts of the throughput and battery
life test data are given. The information is summarized and an analysis given to provide a clear
indication of the performance of the WLAN, PDA, and VPN software. The throughput experiment
and battery life experiment are discussed separately.
The significance of the results are explained in Chapter V. Results are summarized and a
conclusion is given. Some implications and the research impact is provided along with recommen-




This chapter reviews current literature on the research topic. Background on Personal Digital
Assistants (PDAs), security, and WLANs is given, as well as a discussion of relevant articles and
papers. An overview of the current state of research in this area is also included, demonstrating
the applicability and relevance of this work.
2.1 Introduction
Wireless local area networks (WLANs) are an exciting growing technology. The use of Per-
sonal Digital Assistants (PDAs) is also on the rise. The merging of these two technologies combined
with the need for security has created research opportunities in many fields. The purpose of this
chapter is to describe some of the research involving WLANs and wireless security.
2.2 The Personal Digital Assistant (PDA)
The presence of PDAs is growing very rapidly. They are being used by housewives and C.E.O.s
[Fre02]. They can hold calendar, address book, and task information as well as corporate data.
Applications are being developed to provide a wide range of capabilities on these little computers.
These devices run on operating systems that are scaled down versions of full-size computer operating
systems (O/S). The O/S is minimized to create the smallest possible memory requirements and still
provide the necessary capabilities. A stable storage ROM device provides basic programs for the
PDA. User data and applications are stored in small, volatile RAM, in some cases Flash memory
is used which provides data stability. The displays are LCD screens that are available in 16 bit
grayscale to 64 MB color. Input is touchscreen using a stylus or through external, collapsible,
compact keyboards. Data synchronization, generally through Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports, is
available with most desktop computers. This provides a way to move files and data to and retrieve
it from the PDA, and can also be used for application installation onto the PDA. Most PDAs do not
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have the inherit capability to interact with add-on cards, an extension jacket is necessary. Compaq
has two types of jackets, one provides access to accessory cards that have a Compaq proprietary
interface, the other contains an additional jacket and provides access to standard PC cards [Fre02].
Any security program or tool designed for WLANs and more specifically, PDAs, must be
flexible and very efficient. PDAs generally contain only 1 to 10 percent of the memory commonly
available on desktops computers and are generations behind in processor speed [Fre02]. While
most state-of-the-art PDAs now offer add-on memory cards for data memory, the majority of data
resides in the PDAs main memory. Power consumption is a major issue since the PDAs must run off
small, limited capacity batteries. The throughput of PDA network cards is another major limiting
factor. As opposed to wired networks that have low bit error rates, WLANs have bit error rates
orders of magnitude greater. In general, as the reliability and security of the network improves,
data throughput decreases [YF00, Rus01, Fre02].
2.2.1 The Compaq iPAQ PDA Battery. Battery design and functional information as well
as usage scenarios and power management suggestions from Compaq on iPAQ series H3100, H3600,
H3700 PDAs and the Compaq PC card expansion jacket is provided in [Vin01]. The internal PDA
battery has a 1000 mAh capacity, which is the same as the expansion jacket. The PDA battery
function has been designed so that usage can only drain the PDAs battery to a certain level. A
minimum amount of the charge is maintained in order to preserve user data and applications. The
jacket battery cannot directly power the PDA, but once the PDA battery decreases to a level below
that of the jacket battery, the jacket will begin to charge the PDA. The PDA cannot charge the
jacket. Since the jacket battery charge can be fully used, the additional jacket battery has a greater
usable capacity than the PDAs internal battery, even though they have the same battery capacity
rating. PC card accessories have a dramatic effect on the battery life duration, especially with
cards that are not designed specifically for PDAs. The Constant Use Battery Life Testing table
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in [Vin01] provides results on Compaq’s battery testing and is replicated below in Table 2.1. The
unit used in this research is 64 MB Color Model.
Table 2.1 Compaq Constant Use Battery Life Testing (64 MB Color) (minutes)
Brightness/ Audio Volume iPAQ iPAQ w/ PC Card iPAQ w/ PC Card
Setting Expansion Jacket Empty Expansion Jacket
(avg of cards tested)
Super/Loud (6/6) 90 - 105 330 - 345 180 - 195
Super/Disabled 105 - 120 405 - 420 195 - 210
High/Middle (3/6) 105 - 120 360 - 375 195 - 210
Medium/Disabled 135 - 150 465 - 480 210 - 225
Low/Silent (1/6) 135 - 165 435 - 450 180 - 195
Low/Disabled 165 - 180 525 - 540 210 - 225
Power Save/Loud (6/6) 345 - 360 915 - 930 270 - 285
Power Save/Silent (1/6) 360 - 375 975 - 990 375 - 390
Power Save/Disabled 540 - 555 1115 - 1130 330 - 345
2.3 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Standards
WLANs are of two major types, Infrared (IR) and Radio Frequency (RF). IR networks
are used for short-range open areas and are primarily line of sight. RF networks offer much
greater ranges and can be used in larger networks. This research will focus on the RF networks
[MM99, Kor98].
WLANs are popular due to the ease of installation and inherit mobility of the systems.
WLANs do not require the wired backbone support of a wired network. They are quick to install
and never require upgrades to current wiring or dealing with the installation of a new wired network.
PDA clients can range up to a quarter of mile away from a receiver and still transmit effectively.
Strategically placed network bridges and antennas can extend the range between the client and
wired network indefinitely. Unfortunately, this mobility and flexibility leads to many of the prob-
lems for the networks. While wired networks conduct communications in specific and orderly ways,
WLANs have very open and irregular communications. In a wired network, data packets travel
through a guided media and can only be accessed by tapping into this media. Wireless transmis-
sions occur in the open atmosphere, where they can be naturally reflected and duplicated, resulting
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in numerous “copies” of each transmission, all readily available to anyone interested. WLANs en-
hance many existing applications and make others possible, such as warehouse inventory taking,
co-operative learning, and mobile system monitoring. They also generate advanced requirements
to meet technical and regulatory specifications. Many systems operate in a mixed network envi-
ronment that combines both WLANs and traditional LANs. The network backbone may consist
of a wired network, while the end connections may be wireless [MM99, KK00].
Most WLANs operate in the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) bands in the United
States. The frequencies of these bands are: 902-9289 MHz, 2.4-2.4853 GHz, and 5.728-5.85 GHz.
Operating in these bands does not require licensing by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), but does require the use of spread spectrum technology and limits transmit power to one
watt EIRP (Effective Isotropic Radiated Power). The two most commonly used spread spectrum
technologies are Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) and Frequency Hopping Spread Spec-
trum (FHSS) [MM99].
2.3.1 Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS). Many state-of-the-art WLANs use direct
sequence spread spectrum. In DSSS, the original signal is spread across a given bandwidth using a
spreading code. This code, called the spreading sequence, consists of binary digits that modulate
the original signal. The ratio of the number of bits in the spreading code per data bit sent is
called the spreading ratio. Determining an efficient and effective spreading ratio is a balancing act;
a lower ratio makes more efficient use of the transmitting band, while a higher ratio makes the
signal more resistant to noise. As long as the signal is sufficiently spread, interference in a portion
of the frequency band can be tolerated without inducing bit errors. Without knowledge of the
spreading ratio and sequence it can be difficult to intercept and interpret DSSS signals; but if the
equipment being used is known, transmitted information can be obtained using similar equipment
and scanning across the channels [MM99, SBB01, Rus01].
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2.3.2 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS). While frequency hopping spread
spectrum is not quite as common as direct sequence spread spectrum, it is used in many systems.
As the name suggests, FHSS takes the original signal and transmits some data at a one frequency,
then “hops” to another frequency to transmit. The amount of time spent at a frequency is called
the dwell time and the individual frequencies are called subchannels. In order to function properly,
the transmitter and receiver hop sequence must be synchronized before transmission begins [MM99,
Rus01].
2.3.3 IEEE 802.11b Protocol. The IEEE 802.11b standard defines a Medium Access
Control (MAC) layer and several Physical Layers (PHY): DSSS, FHSS, and IR. It also defines
a privacy standard called Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). An 802.11b network may consist of
several types of stations. These stations types are fixed, portable (movable, but used at a standard
location), or mobile. Two or more stations communicating together create a Basic Service Set
(BSS). An isolated BSS that does not connect to a larger wired network (e.g., via a base computer)
is considered an Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS). A Distribution System (DS) is used to
connect multiple BSS’s. The BSS’s access the DS through an access point, which is an addressable
station. Larger networks consisting of many DS’s and BSS’s are called Extended Service Sets (ESS).
An ESS is robust enough to support movement of stations throughout the ESS, between separate
BSS’s [MM99, Bia00].
Most wired LAN’s use Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)
to resolve packet collisions. WLANs use CSMA with collision avoidance or CSMA/CA since radios
cannot transmit and receive simultaneously with a single antenna. This limitation results in the
“hidden node” problem depicted in Figure 2.1. Because nodes A and C cannot detect each other’s
transmissions, they may attempt to simultaneously send a message to node B located between them
resulting in a collision and data loss. Node B can “hear” both nodes A and C, yet nodes A and C
cannot sense each others transmission.
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Methods used by 802.11 to overcome the hidden node problem are discussed later. Collision
avoidance in 802.11b is implemented using what is called the Distributed Coordination Function
(DCF) [MM99, Bia00]. The DCF uses an exponential backoff counter to deconflict channel access
after a collision. When a collision or failed transmission occurs, the sending node will wait a
number of slots, from 0 to W-1 before resending. The variable W is called the contention window.
The minimum contention window is denoted as Wmin and the maximum contention window is
denoted as Wmax. The two are related by the following equation: Wmax = 2mWmin, where m
is maximum number of times the node can try to resend. The contention window, W, begins at a
default minimum, then doubles after each collision or failure until it reaches the default maximum.
The default minimum and maximum for FHSS are 16 and 1024 , for DSSS are 32, and 1024 slots
respectively[MM99, Bia00].
Figure 2.1 Hidden Node Problem
The DCF has two methods to coordinate packet transmission. The default service is the basic
access mechanism. In this scheme, a node that is waiting to transmit will decrement its backoff
counter while channel is idle. If a transmission is detected, the waiting node suspends decrementing
the counter until the channel is idle for a period of time equal to a Distributed InterFrame Space
(DIFS), also measured in slots. When the DIFS period has elapsed without the channel being
busy, the counter will continue to be decremented. If the channel is idle when the counter reaches
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zero, the node will transmit. Once a destination node has successfully received the packet, it
will immediately send an acknowledgment message to the sending node. If, however, the sending
node does not receive the acknowledgment within a set amount of time, it will resend the message
[MM99, Bia00].
Since the default scheme does not address the hidden node problem, an optional four-way
handshake technique is also supported. This is the Request-To-Send/Clear-To-Send (RTS/CTS)
mechanism. This mechanism listens to the channel and waits when it is busy just like the default
mechanism; but when the backoff counter reaches zero, a Ready-To-Send message (RTS) is sent
instead of a data packet. The RTS is a short message that contains the destination address as well
as the amount of time needed to send the message. If the receiving node receives the RTS without
error, it replies with a Clear-To-Send (CTS). Once the CTS is received, the sender transmits the
packets. Other nodes that receive the RTS and CTS know that the channel is busy. The receiver
sends an acknowledgment for each packet. If the sender does not receive the acknowledgment,
it resends the packet. This helps solve the hidden node problem because the sending nodes only
send small RTS messages before receiving a CTS message. Because of the small size of the RTS
messages, RTS collisions are rare. If a collision between two RTS messages does occur, the cost is
not very great; the time spent creating and sending the message is very short compared to the time
spent sending data packets. The CTS message serves to prevent data packet collisions, all nodes
within sending distance of the receiving node receive the CTS message and know not to transmit.
In the example of Figure 2.1, suppose node A sends a RTS message. When node B receives this
message it replies with a CTS message. Both nodes A and C receive the CTS and node C knows
not to transmit. Even though node C does not directly know that node A is transmitting, it knows
that it cannot transmit because of the CTS message [MM99, Bia00].
2.3.4 Bianchi 802.11 Model. Giuseppe Bianchi created a detailed and well documented
analytical model of the 802.11 (RTS/CTS) protocol described in [Bia00]. Bianchi examines the
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expected performance of a network, looking at the time spent sending handshake and coordination
messages, as well as time lost due to idle and collision times. By calculating the time spent actually
sending data bits and comparing that to the total time associated with that transfer, the efficiency
of the network is modeled. In this model the throughput, S, is defined as [Bia00]
S =
E[P ]




where Ps is the probability the transmission on the channel is a success, Ptr is the probability that
there is at least one transmission in the time slot, E[P ] is the exected packet payload size, σ is
the duration of an empty time slot, Ts is the average time the channel is sensed busy because of a
successful transmission, and Tc is the average time the channel is sensed busy because because of
a collision. Ps, Ptr, Ts, and Tc, can be found using the following formulas [Bia00]
Ps =
nτ(1 − τ)n−1
1 − (1 − τ)n
, (2.2)
Ptr = 1 − (1 − τ)
n, (2.3)
Tc = RTS + 3SIFS + 4δ + CTS + H + E[P ] + ACK + DIFS, and (2.4)
Ts = RTS + DISF + δ (2.5)
where n is the number stations, τ is the probability that a station transmits a packet, RTS is the
transfer time for the RTS message, SIFS is the time of the SIFS period, δ is the propagation delay,
CTS is the transfer time for the CTS message, H is the time overhead created by the physical layer
header plus the MAC layer header, ACK is the transfer time for the ACK message, and DIFS is




2(1 − 2p)(1 − p)
(1 − 2p)(W + 1) + pW (1 − (2p)m))
(2.6)
with
p = 1 − (1 − τ)n−1 (2.7)
where p is the probability of collision, W is the value of the backoff counter, and m is the maximum
backoff value.
Figure 2.2 shows the predicted throughput using this model using the following parameter
values: E[P ] = 8184 bits, H = 400 bits, ACK = 240 bits, RTS = 188 bits, CTS = 240 bits, δ
= 1 µs, σ = 50 µs, SIFS = 28µs, and DIFS = 128µs. The graph consists of four curves, each for
different numbers of stations. The throughput, S, is plotted against the transmission probability,
τ . The maximum value for these curves is approximately 0.84 and occurs at τ = 0.02 for n =
5, 0.01 for 10, 0.005 for 20, and 0.002 for 50. As the number of stations increase, S reaches is
maximum quicker, but drops off at a much faster rate than the smaller networks. The maximum
occurs sooner because the network has higher utilization from more stations, and the rapid drop
occurs because of the increase number of collisions [Bia00].
Figure 2.2 Bianchi Model Throughput Graph
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2.3.5 Chhaya 802.11 Model. Harshal Chhaya and Sanjay Gupta have also developed an
analytical model of the 802.11 (RTS/CTS) protocol in [CG96]. This model provides a formula
to determine network throughput. This throughput value, S, represents the number of successful
packet transmissions over a given interval of time. A statistical definition of this time, the renewal
interval, is used to calculate S. Throughput, S, is defined as [CG96]:




G [G(i, j) + (1 − e
−βG(i,j))Σ(m,n)∈C(i,j)G(m,n)]
1/G + l + lrts + lcts + 3 ∗ SIFS + DIFS + β + lack
(2.9)
where S(i,j) is the throughput from node i to node j, A is the set of all nodes in the network area,
ps(i,j) is the probability that the transmission from node i to j is successful, G(i,j) is the rate of
the exponential distribution that defines the time until a transmission is generated at i destined
for j, G is the sum of the rates for all the node pairs in A, l is the length (in time units) of a data
frame, lRTS, lCTS, lACK : The length (in time units) of a rts, cts, and ack frame normalized by the
expected length of a data frame, β, is the propagation delay normalized by the expected length of
a data frame, DIFS is the time of the DIFS period, and SIFS is the time of the SIFS period.
Using the above formula with the following typical variables: l = 1, β = 0.05, SIFS =
0.05, DIFS = 0.15, lack = 0.15, and lrts = lcts = 0.15, and a randomly selected set of nodes with
various coordinates, results in Figure 2.3 [CG96]. The number, nature, and location of nodes was
used to determine the remaining factors.
This graph shows the throughput value, S, as a function of the offered load, G. Several curves
are shown representing S with a variety in the number of nodes in the network. The results of
this model are similar to those of the Bianchi model, but not quite as limited. For these plots, the
maximum occurs with G between 5 and 10. After the maximum is reached, S decreases, but even
2-10
Figure 2.3 Chhaya Model Throughput Graph
for N = 50, this drop is gradual. Again, an initial increase in load raises S to the maximum, but
as the load increases, S decreases due to more collisions [CG96].
2.4 Network Security
2.4.1 Overview. Computer network security incorporates many possible capability op-
tions. There are various levels of security that can be applied and different methods to achieve the
desired ends. Security can consist of data encryption, network isolation, user authentication, or
any combination of these. This section provides basic information about these security capabilities
and their usefulness and impact on a WLAN.
2.4.2 Encryption. A basic form of security, data encryption consists of taking user data
and manipulating it in some know manner. Ideally, only the data source knows exactly how the
data is encrypted, and only the source and destination know how to decrypt it. Take the data
packet in Figure 2.4 as an example. The user application on computer one has created data that
needs to be sent to computer two. Computers one and two established a trust relationship at
some time in the past and have knowledge of expected key usage. The application data along with
any of the upper layer headers and trailers is encrypted and unreadable without the decryption
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key. Encryption is accomplished through a series of calculations based on a specific algorithm and
encryption key. The encrypted data is packaged for transmission over the network with appropriate
network and physical layer headers and trailers, then sent to computer two. Computer two knows
which decryption key to use to decrypt data from computer one. In this manner, data can be sent
between two computers without compromising the data [Lab00, Sti95].
Figure 2.4 Data Encryption
To ensure security, modern encryption algorithm’s are highly scrutinized. These algorithms
were designed primarily for use on wired networks where data routing and accessability is more
controlled than a wireless environment. Encryption is only a data protection scheme, network
control and protection (i.e., authenticated) must be provided through other means [Sti95].
Three widely used algorithms in wired networks are RSA and Triple-DES (Data Encryption
Standard) [Lab00] for encryption and Kerberos [KK00, NT94, Sti95] for authentication. All are
computationally expensive and are not well suited for WLANs. The symmetric key cryptography
of triple-DES is quite sophisticated and maintains security without exposing individual keys and
can be quite fast when implemented in hardware. RSA, however, creates a great deal of overhead
and is relatively slow. When implemented in a wireless network, efficiency and throughput tend
to fall to unacceptable levels [KK00]. Symmetric key algorithms are less computationally complex
and quicker but require complicated key control and distribution methods that work against the
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ease and flexibility of a WLAN. Kerberos also requires undesirable levels of overhead. To ensure
authentication, six handshake messages must occur between the client and three separate server
machines [NT94]. WLAN security and encryption has the dual challenge of requiring more flexibility
and yet also be more robust than wired network counterpart [KK00, NT94].
2.4.3 Firewalls. Network isolation is a very popular method for achieving security. By
creating a boundary, or firewall, at the edge of a network, all incoming and outgoing traffic can
be controlled. Figure 2.5 shows a typical network topology that is not isolated. Switches connect
workstations and servers through a router. The router also provides access to an external network,
in this case, the Internet. All computers in the network have free access to the Internet and vice
versa. Figure 2.6 shows a network with a firewall in place. With this implementation, all network
traffic behind the firewall is unrestricted. Local machines still have complete access to one another.
However, any traffic that must leave or enter the local network goes through the firewall server, the
single point of access to the external network. This single controlled entry point creates a potential
bottleneck in network traffic. The source and destination information is masked at the firewall so
external computers do not receive information about the internal network. Incoming messages can
be screened and monitored to implement control mechanisms when necessary.
One example of a firewall system consists of a server with routers on either side. Because all
external traffic will pass through this computer, it must be powerful and reliable enough to manage
large amounts of data. Routers typically provide initial screening of all packets based on a set of
static rules. The server offers more flexible control and oversight of the routers. All transmissions
and messages can be logged. By restricting access through this single point, the firewall system
can carefully guard and inspect all traffic flowing to and from the LAN [MBWV98, Usk97].
2.4.4 Authentication. Often used in conjunction with a firewall, authentication is an ac-
cess control mechanism for users and computers on the network. An authentication server maintains
information on all authorized users and devices. When a user logs in, they are required to pro-
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Figure 2.5 Network Topology
Figure 2.6 Network Topology with Firewall
vide a password and account ID. Devices are often monitored through their unique MAC address.
Authentication provides confidence that everything participating in the network is a validated and
allowed entity.
2.4.5 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). While encryption, firewalls, and authentication
provide key aspects of network security, a Virtual Private Network, or VPN, provides all this in a
single package. VPNs provide improvements to security that are needed before WLANs are allowed
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of tunneling, encryption, authentication, and access control used to carry traffic over an unsecure
network. It is implemented by using a portion of a shared wired network’s bandwidth to emulate the
characteristics of a private network. These characteristics are: to provide the ability to exchange
information between separated pieces of the network and to provide the privacy and security of a
true private network. The connection is virtual; the VPN topology is constructed on top of shared
physical network. A VPN provides robust encryption and authentication protocols enabling secure
transmissions between two separate, secure networks over an unsecure network. Originally, VPNs
were designed for communications over a wired network; but the same security requirements exist
in WLANs. Instead of creating a virtual connection over shared wire, a VPN can be used tg create
a virtual connection across shared airspace. Packages are bundled and encapsulated, then passed
through a set of nodes specified by the routing headers attached to the newly formed package.
Encryption is used not only on data, but on routing information as well. Only the minimum
amount of information necessary to get the encrypted packet from one firewall to the other is left in
the clear. Firewall servers in VPNs, often called gateways, are responsible for examining all traffic
into and out of the network. [Usk97, Kor98, Ven01, PE00, You00, WIASG01].
There are two primary tunneling protocols in use for VPNs, both developed by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF - www.ietf.org). The first is a layer 2 tunneling protocol (L2TP)
[Ven01, You00]. This data link layer protocol is beneficial because it supports the Point-to-Point
Protocol (PPP) for encapsulation which does not require additional software for the client. The
second protocol is the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), a level 3 network layer implementation.
This protocol provides end-to-end IP traffic security and was designed specifically for larger, wired
networks. Neither of these protocols are fully mature; they are being continuously improved and
further developed [Usk97, Kor98, Ven01, Cus01, You00].
VPNs offer a range of encryption and authentication protocols adjustable to meet various
security requirements. The encryption algorithms run from the weak privacy of WEP to the
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relatively strong triple-DES encryption [Ven01, You00]. Authentication methods include MAC
address approval tables, key-enabled authentication, as well as authentication headers that provide
verification of the integrity of received packets. While VPNs provide required security features,
current implementations can drastically degrade throughput. In [PE00], a high security VPN
caused up to a 65 percent decrease in data throughput on a 100 Mbps network, and 97 percent
utilization of an AMD K6 400 MHz PC. The degradation is not nearly as severe in lower speed
networks (33.6 Kb/s) [Usk97, Kor98, Ven01, PE00, You00].
Figure 2.7 VPN Network Topology
VPNs incorporate aspects of all the previously mentioned security capabilities into one pack-
age that provides more comprehensive security. Figure 2.7 shows one possible VPN setup. This
VPN consists of three separate networks, the primary, remote, and wireless networks. Data sent
from any of these networks to another is encrypted. When two computers within either the re-
mote or primary network need to communicate, it is done without any encryption. Since user and
device authentication are in place, two computers behind the same firewall are trusted and can
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communicate freely. When computers from the primary and remote network need to communicate,
the procedures are very different. Assume computer one, in the primary network, needs to send
data to computer 2, in the remote network. Computer one sends an unencrypted message to the
firewall (or gateway) server which examines the source and destination of the packet, then encrypts
it (Figure 2.8). This encrypted packet has a header that contains the minimum amount of informa-
tion necessary to get the packet to the firewall of the remote network. When the VPN is initially
established, communication between the firewall servers is conducted to develop the proper com-
munication paths and methods. The receiving firewall examines the incoming packet and decrypts
the packet. The decrypted packet is sent, within the remote network to its destination.
The Air Force Systems Networking Program Office at Maxwell AFB, AL has been working
on an Air Force wide VPN implementation, the Common User (CU) Virtual Private Network.
The goal of this program is to provide information protection of its sensitive but unclassified
data transmitted over the DoD Intranet (NIPERNET) [Off01]. This VPN will provide secure
communications between all AF installations. Testing of this VPN with a gateway server with one
network card has demonstrated a the maximum throughput of 70 Mbps [Off01].
2.4.6 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). The only inherent 802.11b data protection
scheme is Wired Equivalent Privacy. This scheme was not intended to provide a strong encryption
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of data, only to offer a measure of privacy that one would expect on a wired network. WEP
currently has two different forms, a 40-bit key weak encryption; and a newer 128-bit key encryption
[BB01, SBB01, Rus01, Usk97, Wea00, Kor98, SIR01].
While this scheme provides some privacy, it does not provide adequate security. WEP uses
an RC4 [Lab00] cipher to encrypt data. Unfortunately the same secret key is used for all devices
on the network and also has very predictable methods for generating an initialization vector, which
is attached to the secret key and changed with every use [SIR01]. These two characteristics make
it easy to break. A possible solution for this problem is manual generation and maintenance of
all keys. While effective, this is support intensive and not practical for large networks. According
to 1995 figures, the 40-bit encryption can be broken through brute force methods in 2 seconds
with hardware worth $100,000 and in merely 2 ms with hardware worth $1,000,000 [Usk97]. Since
1995 the price of hardware has dropped drastically. It is not practical to break the 128-bit version
through brute force, but the key-based implementation still leaves a WEP-only protected network
vulnerable. A single static key is typically used for the entire network. If this single key is comprised,
the entire network is compromised [BB01, SBB01, Rus01, Usk97, Wea00, Kor98, SIR01].
2.4.7 WLAN Security. The ability to safeguard a wireless network is difficult and
802.11b’s inherit privacy scheme, WEP, is not robust enough. Other security measures must be
used to protect wireless networks. A popular method used to improve security is to implement a
secure mutual authentication process. In this process, a wireless node is denied access to the wired
network until the wireless node and wired access point can mutually authenticate. During this
authentication, a secure session key is created between the access point and wireless node. After
authentication, the session key is used to encrypt and send the WEP encryption key. This type of
mutual authentication is handled differently in various implementations, but the basic idea is the
same. Another method is to use controlled lists of approved MAC addresses. Any MAC address
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not approved will not be authenticated. This scheme can only be realistically implemented a small,
controlled, relatively static network [BB01, SBB01, Rus01, Usk97, Kor98, Gar02].
Other security concerns revolve around the “free” nature of the wireless transmissions. Au-
thentic signals are easily intercepted and available for examination. Ambient noise signals are
abundant and need to be sorted through. Signals not intended for the network and other malicious
signals must be rejected. One problem is interference created from other products using the same
frequency band. Another problem is denial-service attacks that hackers can generate by saturat-
ing the network with jamming signals. Because it must be assumed that authentic signals will
be intercepted, they need to be encrypted or otherwise safeguarded. WLANs must be intelligent
enough to recognize signals from their own network and ignore all others. Furthermore, hackers
often use specialized transmitters and receivers to deceive authentic stations. By mimicking an
authentic base station, a hacker can route all legitimate traffic through their own system, quietly
monitoring all traffic; possibly gaining authentication and communication protocol information.
By mimicking an authentic mobile station, a hacker may be able to convince the network to al-
low the hacker access. Once the fake station gains access, the entire network is compromised
[MBWV98, Rus01, Usk97, Gar02].
A source of concern with PDAs is their physical size and accessibility. The inherent mobility
of a PDA leads to theft susceptibility. Careless users may set the PDA down for just a minute, or
possible forget the PDA somewhere. If they were logged in at the time, a hacker has free access to
the PDA and the network. Even if the user is not logged in, native password control on PDAs is
very weak and easily defeated. Due to the lack of permanent storage, PDAs store all data in their
RAM, which makes them very vulnerable to virus and trojan horses [Gar02].
The current trend in WLAN security is a movement to VPN implementation [Ven01, You00,
WIASG01, Off01, Gar02]. Recent releases of commercial VPNs include PDA client software that
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claims to be efficient, yet powerful, making WLAN VPNs possible. These VPNs may provide the
necessary security, but is the performance impact too great [Ven01, You00, WIASG01, Gar02]?
2.5 Summary
This chapter provides an overview of WLAN and PDA technology and protocols. In-depth
information about the wide range of security concerns and issues is presented, along with possible
solutions and ways to combat the problems. Research into WLANs is covered, proving insight to
the analysis of the WLANs.
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III. Experimental Methodology
This chapter contains the methodology used in this research. Specific goals are described and
a hypothesis given. The approach for meeting these goals and determining the validity of the
hypothesis is presented as well.
3.1 Problem Definition
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis. This research is divided into two major sections, a through-
put performance analysis and a battery life duration determination. The primary goal of the
throughput performance analysis is to evaluate the effect of a virtual private network (VPN) im-
plementation on the throughput of a wireless local area network (WLAN) which contains personal
digital assistant (PDA) clients. The secondary goals are to evaluate the effect on throughput from
the size of transferred files and client distance from the receiving antenna. The goal of battery life
duration experiments is to determine how long the PDA can operate under constant use as well as
to estimate the amount of time the battery in the external jacket can extend the life of the unit.
It is expected that the throughput of the WLAN will decrease under the following conditions:
implementation of the VPN, increased file size, and increased client distance. The VPN is expected
to have the greatest effect on the throughput, much greater than both the file size and client
distance. Based on information from the Compaq white paper on the iPAQ’s battery [Vin01] it is
expected that the battery life will be approximately 210-225 minutes.
3.1.2 Approach. The WLAN is based on the IEEE 802.11b wireless protocol and uses
Microsoft’s Windows 2000 and Pocket PC 2002 operating systems with Check Point’s VPN-1
SecureClient [Ltd00] software (cf., Appendix B for VPN setup information).
The hardware level security available in current wireless network cards, usually encryp-
tion algorithms such as Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and RC4 (Ron’s Code or Rivest’s
Cipher)[Lab00], is not adequate for the intended use of this system, so any card security features
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are disabled. Most of these encryption algorithms have been shown to be “weak,” but even the
“strong” ones only encrypt the data and leave valuable network information in the clear and thus
create vulnerabilities via wireless access points. Because of these drawbacks, hardware security is
not relied upon and is not used or tested.
To meet the security requirements for this system, a Virtual Private Network (VPN) was
needed. Check Point, an Internet security company has developed VPN-1, a program designed for
use in a Windows and Pocket PC environment [Ltd00]. This program provides the encryption,
authentication, and compression features that are required.
As part of this evaluation, the effective data transfer rates of the system with the VPN
incorporated is determined. The handheld battery life in real-world use is examined and some
range limitations determined. The system sustains various loads depending on the range, with the
effective data rates lower at larger distances.
Once the protocol and software is thoroughly examined and understood, a detailed analytical
model is used to represent the system. An existing IEEE 802.11b model, as described in Chapter
II, is used. Physical tests of the actual hardware are used to validate the analytical model. The
transmission times and delays are monitored. These tests provide the necessary information to
determine the performance of the wireless LAN.
3.2 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) includes the following (see Figure 3.1):
i) A Dell Poweredge 4200, dual Pentium II 300 MHz CPU server with 512 MB of RAM
operating Windows NT 4.1 server software and VPN-1 SecureClient 4.1 SP3 [Ltd00] server software,
ii) Two Cicso Aironet 340 series 11 MBPS DSSS wireless network bridges [Cis00] with 50
mW output,
iii) A 13.5 dBi Yagi directional antenna (Cisco ]AIR-ANT-AKYAGI),
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iv) A 12 dBi omni-directional antenna (Cisco ]AIR-ANT-AKOMNI),
v) A Compaq Ipaq 3650 PDA [Com00] running Pocket PC 2002 with VPN-1 SecureClient
4.1 [Ltd00] client software,
vi)A Cisco Aironet 340 series 11 MBPS DSSS wireless network PC card [Cis00] adapter,
Figure 3.1 System Under Test
The Component Under Test (CUT) is the PDA, including the VPN-1 SecureClient [Ltd00]
software and the wireless network card. The wireless network card adapter is a Cisco Aironet 340
series card [Cis00] which implements IEEE 802.11b. The expected operational implementation of
this system is 2-5 clients that send and receive data in regular, bursty data transmissions, which
means there will be few collisions. The system is tested with only one client since it is assumed
clients in the operational setting will not experience excessive network contention or collisions.
3.3 System Services
This system provides bidirectional transfer of data files over a wireless link. The outcome of
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The primary metric used for this research is the effective data transfer rate of the system.
This rate is measured at the application layer; this provides performance information on user data
transferred, which includes overhead and encapsulation. Performance at several physical distances
is determined, along with the impact of various file sizes. Another metric is the PDA and jacket
(with additional battery) battery life under operational use. It is important to have an accurate
estimation of battery life; a short battery life means that it may be necessary to field extra battery
packs along with the PDA.
3.5 Parameters
3.5.1 System. The system has several parameters of interest, they are as follows:
i) Wireless protocol - the protocol in use affects the transmission efficiency and reliability.
ii) Antenna distance - this range limits the maximum distances of the station from the building
and the client from the station. The distance of the clients from the station affects the data transfer
rates since the signal attenuates as the range increases.
iii) Network security level - the security level affects the network performance; VPN security
requires more overhead.
iv) Level of hardware encryption - the network hardware can have WEP 128 running or not
running.
3.5.2 Workload. Workload parameters that vary according to the user’s needs are as
follows:
i) File size - larger files require more time to process and transmit.
ii) Client distance from the station - the further the client is from the station, the weaker the
signal and the more likely errors are to occur.
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iii) Arrival rate - excessive frequent arrivals reduce throughput because of queuing delays
iv) Number of clients - more clients result in more transmissions which can result in collisions,
reducing the throughput.
3.6 Factors
The three factors selected for this research are shown in Table 3.1:
Table 3.1 Experimental Factors
FACTOR LEVELS
Client Distance Close (5 ft.), Typical (700 ft.), Far (1300 ft.)
File Size Small (10 KB), Medium (50 KB), Large (100 KB)
Network Security Unsecure (VPN off), Secure (VPN on)
3.7 Evaluation Technique
The evaluation technique is the measurement of a hardware implementation of the system.
The hardware is tested in the operational configuration. The throughput values that occur during
file transfers are measured to determine the expected throughput values of the system. Values for
the system with the VPN on and with the VPN off are examined separately, then compared to
determine the VPN effect on the system. Using settings which replicate constant use, the PDAs
(with jacket battery) battery life is tested by running the PDA until the battery has been exhausted.
3.8 Workload
Three different file sizes are offered to the system. The small file size consists of 10 KB
files transmitted to the client. New files are sent only after receipt of the previous file has been
acknowledged to insure independent measurement for each file. The medium file size increases the
size of the packets to 50 KB. The third file size is a file of size 100 KB. These file sizes were selected
to represent a range of workload conditions.
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3.9 Experimental Design
3.9.1 Throughput Experiment. The throughput experiment is full factorial with 15 repli-
cations for each test. Each client distance and file size factor level combination is tested with the
VPN on and off, these test cases are shown in Table 3.2. A vendor supplied software program
that uses TCP and Microsoft Winsock to transfer files is used (cf., Appendix A). This software is
provided by Microsoft as the standard method to transport files to and from a PDA using a net-
work connection. The server version listens for a client connection request. When a client requests
connection, the connection is made. Similar user interfaces exist on both the server and the client.
The data file name can be changed and the file size selected. Once the transfer is initiated, the
server starts an internal timer and begins sending the file. Once the client has received the file, it
sends an acknowledgment. The server stops the timer once it receives the acknowledgment. The
total transfer time is recorded as the elapsed time between server initiation and client acknowledg-
ment. The turnaround time at the client, the elapsed time between when the client receives the
file and sends the acknowledgment, as well as the transfer time for the acknowledgment message
are included in the total transfer time.
Table 3.2 Throughput Test Cases
TEST NETWORK SECURITY CLIENT DISTANCE FILE SIZE
1 Off Close Small
2 Off Close Medium
3 Off Close Large
4 Off Typical Small
5 Off Typical Medium
6 Off Typical Large
7 Off Far Small
8 Off Far Medium
9 Off Far Large
10 On Close Small
11 On Close Medium
12 On Close Large
13 On Typical Small
14 On Typical Medium
15 On Typical Large
16 On Far Small
17 On Far Medium
18 On Far Large
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3.9.2 Battery Life Experiment. Battery life is determined by using the settings shown
in Table 3.3. These settings are selected to represent constant use. Two PDAs and two PDA
jackets are used. The PDA jackets contain a battery and are required for the PDA to be able
to interface with the wireless network card. Since the jacket is required, the battery life of the
PDA and jacket cannot be measured independently. The test consists of establishing the wireless
connection whith a fully charged PDA that is attached to an external power source. A 50 KB
file is transmitted continuously, beginning immediately after disconnection from the external power
source. The server logs the time of every file sent to and received by the client. The difference in the
time of the first file transfer and the last file transfer determines the battery life of the PDA/jacket
battery combination. Both PDAs are tested with both jackets; tests are replicated five times for
each combination.
Table 3.3 Battery Life Test Settings




File Size 50 KB
3.10 Summary
In order to determine the performance of a VPN secure WLAN with PDA clients, the system
is analyzed and defined. A WLAN consisting of a PDA client, antennas, bridge, and server is
established. The service provided and system parameters are examined to select the appropriate
test factors. The factors selected for variation are client distance, file size, and VPN security off or
on. A full factorial, 15 replication test set is run to evaluate the impact of the factor levels. The
PDA and Jacket battery combination is also tested to find the expected operational duration of
the client.
Along with the key metric of VPN impact, the impact of file size and data transmission range
is determined to evaluate the performance of this wireless local area network. The testing involves
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several key factors: the distance of the client from the station, file size, and the desired network




Research results are presented in this chapter. Detailed descriptions of test data are given. The
information is summarized and an analysis given to provide a clear indication of the WLAN,
PDA, and VPN software performance. The throughput experiment and battery life experiment are
discussed separately.
4.1 Throughput Experiment
Results of the throughput experiment are given and summarized to provide the impact of
three factors: client distance, file size, and VPN on or off. Since the primary goal of the research
is to obtain a performance comparison with and without the VPN, the experiments on each will
be conducted independently. The results are analyzed separately and then compared. The next
two sections provide the results and factor level interactions and effects for the VPN off cases, then
for VPN on. To determine the factor interactions, a full factorial design with replications is used
[Jai91]. Each section begins with observed data and demonstrates how the factor level interactions
and effects are determined. A summary of the factor level effects is given in a percentage form; the
factor’s impact is shown as the ratio of the effect and the mean throughput value. The following
section compares the factor level interactions and effects of the system with and without the VPN.
In the data analysis, examples are given to demonstrate how the values in the tables are generated.
For a more detailed description of the process, refer to [Jai91].
4.1.1 VPN off. The results for test cases 1-9, VPN off, are discussed in the next section.
The following two sections detail the effects and impact of each factor level. A summary provides
a condensed table that includes the impact from each factor level.
4.1.1.1 Results. In Table 4.1, the mean of the throughput values (bps), standard
deviation, coefficient of variation (C.O.V.), and a 90% confidence interval for the mean are given
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for 15 replications of each test. The throughput mean values represent average throughput values
observed for all 15 test replications. The standard deviation and C.O.V. describe the spread of the
observed values around the mean. The throughput is determined by dividing the file size (which
varies according to the file size) by the recorded time of the transfer. The standard deviation is
calculated by taking the square root of the following: the number of replications times the sum
of each observed throughput squared minus the square of the sum of all the observed throughput
all divided by the number of replications times the number of replications minus one. The C.O.V.
is determined by dividing the standard deviation by the mean. The confidence interval is found
by adding and subtracting the following value from the mean: the appropriate value for the area
under the standard normal curve times the standard deviation divided by the square root of the
number of replications.
Table 4.1 VPN Off Results
MEAN STANDARD DEV. C.O.V. 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
Test bps bps bps
1 12,138 127 0.010 (12,084, 12,192)
2 11,750 62 0.005 (11,724, 11,776)
3 11,674 63 0.005 (11,648, 11,701)
4 12,028 134 0.011 (11,972, 12,085)
5 11,767 54 0.005 (11,745, 11,790)
6 11,605 59 0.005 (11,580, 11,630)
7 11,976 128 0.011 (11,922, 12,031)
8 11,752 63 0.006 (11,725, 11,779)
9 11,639 62 0.006 (11,613, 11,665)
To determine the factor level interactions and effects for the client distance and file size, a
Computation of Effects table is constructed (e.g., Table 4.2). This table shows the mean values
for all the replications in each test. The mean throughput value for each client distance and file
size is determined by row and column. The overall mean throughput of the entire data set is also
determined. The effect of each client distance and file size is determined by subtracting the overall
throughput from each client distance and file size throughput. For instance, the throughput mean
values for the close tests (12,138, 11,750, 11,674 bps) is 11,854 bps. This value is 39 bps more than
the overall mean throughput value of 11,815 bps.
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Table 4.2 VPN Off Computation of Effects
all values bps CLOSE TYPICAL FAR ROW MEAN ROW EFFECT
SMALL 12,138 12,028 11,976 12,048 233
MEDIUM 11,750 11,767 11,752 11,757 -58
LARGE 11,674 11,605 11,639 11,640 -175
COLUMN MEAN 11,854 11,801 11,790 11,815
COLUMN EFFECT 39 -14 -25
Table 4.3 VPN Off Interactions
all values bps CLOSE TYPICAL FAR
SMALL 51 -5 -46
MEDIUM -46 25 21
LARGE -5 -20 25
The computation of effects shows the overall mean throughput is 11,815 bps. The effects from
the client distance is small and while the effects from the file size are greater, they are still small
compared to the mean throughput.
The next step is to create the Interaction Table (e.g., Table 4.3). This table is created by
subtracting the overall mean, the row effect, and column effect from the throughput mean for that
cell. For example, the throughput value of close and small test is 12,,138 bps, subtract from this
the overall mean (11815 bps), the row effect (233 bps), and the column effect (39 bps) to get the
interaction value (51 bps).
The interaction effects of the factors are small, all less than 51 bps. This shows that the effects
of the combined factor levels is minor compared to the overall mean throughput. The combination
of factor levels creates little effect in addition to the effects caused independently from the factor
levels.
The third step to the develop an Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA) table, which is Table 4.4.
This table contains the following values for each component of interest: Sum of Squares (SoS),
Percentage of Variation (PoV), Degrees of Freedom (DoF), Mean Square (MS), the F-Computed
(F-C), and the F-Table (F-T). The SoS represents the sum of all the squared values of that com-
ponent, appropriately multiplied. The PoV shows the percentage in variation that the component
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has created. The DoF is the number of values that can be independently chosen for that com-
ponent. The MS is the component’s SoS divided by its DoF. F-C is calculated using the MS of
that component divided by the MS of the errors. F-T is determined by using a statistical table.
The F- values are used to demonstrate whether or not the variations created by the component
are statistically significant. Take the file size component for example, the SoS is the sum of all
the file size effects squared (2332 + (-58)2 + (-175)2) multiplied by the number of replications (15)
and number of levels of client distance (3), which equals 3,980,559. The PoV is 100 times its SoS
(3,980,559) divided by the result of the SoS of the all the responses (18,849,011,437) minus the SoS
of the mean response (18,843,773,779), which is 76%. The file size component has two degrees of
freedom. The first choice of file size is independent, either small, medium, or large can be selected.
The second choice can be freely selected, either of the remaining choices are available. Once the
second selection is made, the final selection has no independence, it must be the last remaining file
size. Because two selections can be made freely, this component has two degrees of freedom. The
MS for file size is the SoS for file size (3,980,559) divided by its degrees of freedom (2), which equals
1,990,279. The F-C for file size its MS (1,990,279) divided by the MS for errors (8,039), which is
248. This is higher than the F-T value which is approximately 2.4. The final portion of this table
is the standard deviation of errors, noted on the last line.
Table 4.4 VPN Off ANOVA
COMPONENT SoS PoV DoF MS F-C F-T
ALL MEANS 18,849,011,437 135
MEAN RESPONSE 18,843,773,779 1
ALL MEANS -
MEAN RESPONSE 5,237,658 100 134
CLIENT DISTANCE 109,409 2 2 54,707 7 ≈2.4
FILE SIZE 3,980,559 76 2 1990,,279 248 ≈2.4
INTERACTIONS 134,821 3 4 3,3705 4 ≈2.1
ERRORS 1,012,869 19 126 8,039
Standard Deviation for Errors = 89.66
The percentage of variation (PoV) for the various components is important in the analysis
of the data. For the VPN off tests, the greatest cause of variation in the mean throughput is
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the file size (76%), the effect of experimental errors is a distant second (19%), the third largest
percentage comes from interactions (3%), the final factor is client distance (2%). This information
indicates that changing the file size is going to have the greatest impact on the throughput, but
it is important to remember that this impact is small compared to the mean throughput (see the
Computation of Effects table). All the F-C values are greater than the F-T values, which indicates
that the effect from components are statistically significant.
The next table, Table 4.5, shows the actual effects of the factor levels and the 90% confidence
intervals associated with them. The mean effect is drawn from the appropriate column or row
effect of the Computation of Effects Table (Table 4.2). The standard deviation is the calculated
standard deviation for that set of the sample. The confidence interval is generated by adding or
subtracting 1.645 times the standard deviation from the Mean Effect. Since the error degrees of
freedom is greater than 30 (actually 126), the 0.95 quantile of unit normal Z 0.95 is used instead
of the t-variate. This value is 1.645. For instance, the mean response’s mean effect is 11815 bps.
The standard deviation is calculated by multiplying the standard deviation of the errors (89.66)
times the square root of the inverse of the total degrees of freedom (1/135), which is 7.72. This is
multiplied by 1.645 and subtracted from the mean effect (11,815) for the lower bound of confidence
interval, 11,802. The upper bound of the confidence interval is calculated by adding the standard
deviation times 1.645 to the mean effect, equaling 11,827.
Table 4.5 VPN Off Confidence Intervals for Effects
all values bps MEAN STANDARD CONFIDENCE
EFFECT DEVIATION INTERVAL
MEAN 11,815 7.72 (11,802, 11,827)
CLOSE 40 10.91 (22, 58)
TYPICAL -14 10.91 (-32, 4)
FAR -25 10.91 (-43, -7)
SMALL 233 10.91 (215, 251)
MEDIUM -58 10.91 (-76, -40)
LARGE -175 10.91 (-193, -157)
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The standard deviation of the overall mean throughput and factor levels are all below 11
bps, much smaller than the overall mean throughput. This shows up in the confidence intervals,
which are very narrow. The calculated value for the overall mean throughput and mean effects
for the factor levels have a high certainty of accuracy. The confidence interval for the effect of the
client distance factor level of close encompasses zero, indicating that its impact is not significantly
different from a zero effect.
The final table, Table 4.6, addresses the 90% confidence intervals for the interactions. For
each client distance and file size combination, the confidence interval for effect on the overall mean
throughput is given. The standard deviation for the interactions is given on the bottom of the table.
This was calculated by multiplying the standard deviation of the errors (89.66) by the square root
of the result of degrees of freedom in the file size (2) multiplied by the degrees of freedom in the
client distances (2) divided by the total degrees of freedom (135) to get 13.37. These confidence
intervals were generated in the same fashion as the confidence intervals for effects.
Table 4.6 VPN Off Confidence Intervals for Interactions
all values bps CLOSE TYPICAL FAR
SMALL (29, 73) (-27, 17) (-68, -24)
MEDIUM (-68, -24) (3, 47) (-1, 43)
LARGE (-27, 17) (-42, 2) (3, 47)
Standard Deviation for Interactions = 13.37
It is important to recognize that two of the three confidence intervals for the typical client
distance include zero, demonstrating that they are not significantly different from a zero effect.
4.1.1.2 Client Distance Impact. Table 4.7 summarizes the factor level impact of the
client distance. The ratio of the effect to the mean throughput is less than 0.5% for each factor
level. This impact is not large enough to support a claim of significant throughput impact due to
changing the client distance.
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Table 4.7 VPN Off Client Distance Impact
CLOSE TYPICAL FAR
EFFECT 39 ± 18 bps -14 ± 18 bps -25 ± 18 bps
IMPACT 0.33% -0.12% -0.21%
Mean Throughput = 11,815 bps
4.1.1.3 File Size Impact. Table 4.8 summarizes the factor level impact of the file
size. The level of the file size factor has minor impact on the throughput of the network. The ratio
of the effect to the mean throughput is almost 2% for both the small and large factor levels. This
impact demonstrates that a larger file size will decrease throughput, but not drastically.
Table 4.8 VPN Off File Size Impact
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
EFFECT 233 ± 18 bps -58 ± 18 bps -175 ± 18 bps
IMPACT 1.97% -0.49% -1.48%
Mean Throughput = 11,815 bps
4.1.1.4 Summary. Table 4.9 summarizes the factor level impact for client distance
and file size. This table shows the impact caused by each factor relative to the mean throughput.
The impact of the client distance and file size factors are minor. While the impact due to changing
the file size factor is most significant, it’s impact only results in a change of about 2% in the mean
throughput.
Table 4.9 VPN Off Factor Level Impact
CLIENT DISTANCE FILE SIZE
CLOSE TYPICAL FAR SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
IMPACT 0.33% -0.12% -0.21% 1.97% -0.49% -1.48%
Mean Throughput = 11,815 bps
4.1.2 VPN On. The results for test cases 10-18, VPN on, are discussed in the next
section. The following two sections detail the effects and impact of each factor level. A summary
provides a condensed table that includes the impact from each factor level. Examples are given in
the previous section for each of the tables included below, they will not be repeated in this section.
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4.1.2.1 Results. Table 4.10 shows the same information, the Results, for the VPN
on tests as Table 4.1 for VPN off.
Table 4.10 VPN On Results
MEAN STANDARD DEV. C.O.V. 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
Test bps bps bps
10 11,749 40 0.003 (11,732, 11,766)
11 11,438 39 0.003 (11,421, 11,454)
12 11,226 36 0.003 (11,211, 11,241)
13 11,645 71 0.006 (11,615, 11,675)
14 11,348 37 0.003 (11,332, 11,364)
15 11,192 29 0.003 (11,180, 11,205)
16 11,670 64 0.005 (11,643, 11,697)
17 11,279 49 0.004 (11,258, 11,300)
18 10,972 22 0.002 (10,962, 10,981)
Table 4.11 shows the same information, Computation of Effects, for the VPN on tests as
Table 4.2 for VPN off. The computation of effects shows the overall mean throughput is 11,391
bps. The effects from the client distance is small and while the effects from the file size are greater,
they are still small compared to the mean throughput.
Table 4.12 shows the same information, the Interactions, for the VPN on tests as Table 4.3
for VPN off.The interaction effects of the factors are small, all less than 70 bps. This shows that
the effects of the combined factor levels is minor compared to the overall mean throughput. The
combination of factor levels creates little effect in addition to the effects caused independently from
the factor levels.
Table 4.13 shows the same information, the ANOVA, for the VPN on tests as Table 4.4 for
VPN off. The percentage of variation (PoV) for the various components is important in the analysis
of the data. For the VPN on tests, the greatest cause of variation in the mean throughput is the file
Table 4.11 VPN On Computation of Effects
all values bps CLOSE TYPICAL FAR ROW MEAN ROW EFFECT
SMALL 11,749 11,645 11,670 11,688 297
MEDIUM 11,437 11,348 11,279 11,355 -36
LARGE 11,226 11,192 10,972 11,130 -261
COLUMN MEAN 11,471 11,395 11,307 11,391
COLUMN EFFECT 80 4 -84
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Table 4.12 VPN On Interactions
all values bps CLOSE TYPICAL FAR
SMALL -19 -47 66
MEDIUM 3 -11 8
LARGE 16 58 -74
Table 4.13 VPN On ANOVA
COMPONENT SoS PoV DoF MS F-C F-T
ALL MEANS 17,524,889,797 135
MEAN RESPONSE 17,516,681,622 1
ALL MEANS -
MEAN RESPONSE 8,208,175 100 134
CLIENT DISTANCE 606,555 7 2 303,278 147 ≈2.4
FILE SIZE 7,095,747 87 2 3,547,874 1,720 ≈2.4
INTERACTIONS 245,940 3 4 61,485 30 ≈2.1
ERRORS 259,932 3 126 2,063
Standard Deviation for Errors = 45.42
size (87%), the effect of client distance is a distant second (7%), the third largest percentage comes
from interactions (3%), the final factor is experimental errors (3%) . This information indicates that
changing the file size is going to have the greatest impact on the throughput, but it is important
to remember that this impact is small compared to the mean throughput (see the Computation of
Effects table). All the F-C values are greater than the F-T values, which indicates that the effect
from components are statistically significant.
Table 4.14 VPN On Confidence Intervals for Effects
all values bps MEAN STANDARD CONFIDENCE
EFFECT DEVIATION INTERVAL
MEAN 11391 3.91 (11385, 11397)
CLOSE 80 5.528 (71, 89)
TYPICAL 4 5.53 (-5, 13)
FAR -84 5.53 (-93, -75)
SMALL 297 5.528 (288, 306)
MEDIUM -36 5.53 (-45, -27)
LARGE -261 5.528 (-270, -252)
Table 4.14 shows the same information,Confidence Intervals for Effects, for the VPN on tests
as Table 4.5 for VPN off. The standard deviation of the overall mean throughput and factor
levels are all below 6 bps, much smaller than the overall mean throughput. This shows up in the
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confidence intervals, which are very narrow. The calculated value for the overall mean throughput
and mean effects for the factor levels have a high certainty of accuracy. The confidence interval for
the effect of the client distance factor level of close encompasses zero, indicating that its impact is
not significantly different from a zero effect.
Table 4.15 shows the same information, Confidence Intervals for Interactions, for the VPN
on tests as Table 4.6 for VPN off.
Table 4.15 VPN On Confidence Intervals for Interactions
all values bps CLOSE TYPICAL FAR
SMALL (-30, -8) (-59, -36) (-55, -77)
MEDIUM (-8, 14) (-22, 0) (-3, 19)
LARGE (5, 27) (47, 70) (-85, -63)
Standard Deviation for Interactions = 6.77
4.1.2.2 Client Distance Impact. Table 4.16 summarizes the factor level impact of
the client distance. The ratio of the effect to the mean throughput is less than 0.8% for each factor
level. This impact is not large enough to support a claim of significant throughput impact due to
changing the client distance.
Table 4.16 VPN On Client Distance Impact
CLOSE TYPICAL FAR
EFFECT 80 ± 9 bps 4 ± 9 bps -84 ± 9 bps
IMPACT 0.70% 0.04% -0.74%
Mean Throughput = 11,391 bps
4.1.2.3 File Size Impact. Table 4.17 summarizes the factor level impact of the File
Size. The level of the file size factor has minor impact on the throughput of the network. The ratio
of the effect to the mean throughput is about 2.5% for both the small and large factor levels. This
impact demonstrates that a higher file size will decrease throughput, but not drastically.
4.1.2.4 Summary. Table 4.18 summarizes the factor level impact for client distance
and File Size. This table shows the impact caused by each factor relative to the mean throughput.
The impact of the client distance and file size factors are minor. While the impact do to changing
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Table 4.17 VPN On File Size Impact
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
EFFECT 297 ± 9 bps -36 ± 9 bps -261 ± 9 bps
IMPACT 2.61% -0.32% -2.29%
Mean Throughput = 11,391 bps
the file size factor is most significant, it’s impact only results in a change of about 2.5% in the mean
throughput.
Table 4.18 VPN On Factor Level Impact
CLIENT DISTANCE FILE SIZE
CLOSE TYPICAL FAR SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
IMPACT 0.70% 0.04% -0.74% 2.60% -0.32% -2.29%
Mean Throughput =11391 bps
4.1.3 Comparison. This section compares the mean throughput values and factor level
effects of the VPN off and VPN on cases analyzed above. This provides a side-by-side comparison
of the network with and without the VPN installed.
4.1.3.1 Throughput. Table 4.19 is a comparison of mean throughput values for each
of the test cases between the VPN off and VPN on. The final line of the table shows the percent
decrease from the VPN off throughput to the VPN on throughput. The decrease ranges from
2.55% to 5.75%. This small percentage decrease is not operationally significant for most WLAN
implementations. The performance decrease is similar to the decrease in [Cus01]. This report stated
a 7% throughput decrease in an 802.11 wireless network with a Windows 2000 laptop. Figure 4.1
shows the trend of this decrease. As the file size and client distance increase, the decrease due to
the VPN rises. The VPN requires more acknowledgment, control, and authentication messages.
Also the encryption algorithm increases overhead. These factors make the VPN implementation
more sensitive to factor changes.
4.1.3.2 Client Distance Impact. Table 4.20 provides a comparison of the client
distance impact determined for both the VPN off and VPN on. Figure 4.2 shows graphs of the
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Table 4.19 Mean Throughput Comparison
CLOSE CLOSE CLOSE
all values bps MEAN SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
VPN OFF 11,815 12,138 11,750 11,674
VPN ON 11,391 11,749 11,437 11,226
Decrease 3.59% 3.20% 2.66% 3.84%
TYPICAL TYPICAL TYPICAL FAR FAR FAR
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
VPN OFF 12,028 11,767 11,605 11,976 11,752 11,639
VPN On 11,645 11,348 11,192 11,670 11,279 10,972
Decrease 3.19% 3.56% 3.55% 2.56% 4.03% 5.74%
Figure 4.1 VPN On Throughput Decrease
impacts. The ranges tested did not stress the system enough. The client distance impact for both
VPN off and on are small, with the VPN on impact slightly larger. This shows that the throughput
of the VPN on cases is more vulnerable to changes. The decrease in performance caused by the
greater ranges is compounded when the VPN is running due to increased messaging requirements
and overhead. Since this impact is insignificant, further distances could be supported without
notably decreasing throughput. The use of the omni-directional antenna to communicate with
the client and with the Yagi directional antenna is quite effective. The omni-directional antenna
provides client use flexibility while supporting reachback to the Yagi antenna and wired network.
4.1.3.3 File Size Impact. Table 4.21 provides a comparison of the file size impact
determined for both the VPN off and VPN on. Figure 4.3 shows graphs of the impacts. The file
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VPN Off to VPN On % Throughput Decrease Linear (VPN Off to VPN On % Throughput Decrease) 
Table 4.20 Client Distance Impact Comparison
CLOSE TYPICAL FAR
VPN OFF 0.33% -0.12% -0.21%
VPN ON 0.70% 0.04% -0.74%
Figure 4.2 Client Distance Impact Graph
size impact for both VPN off and on are small, with the VPN on impact slightly larger. This shows
that the throughput of the VPN on cases is more vulnerable to changes in the same manner as the
client distances. The impact from increasing the file size is linear. By following the data trend, a
150 KB file would decrease the throughput by 4% to 5% and a 300 KB file by 10% to 13%.
Table 4.21 File Size Impact Comparison
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
VPN OFF 1.97% -0.49% -1.48%
VPN ON 2.61% -0.32% -2.29%
4.1.3.4 Summary. The test data supports the hypothesis, that the VPN would
negatively effect the throughput, but not to unacceptable levels. The interesting fact about the
data is the low throughput achieved. The wireless card used is rated at 11 Mbps (11,000,000 bps)
but the network’s highest measured data rate was 12,290 bps. Using Bianchi’s model [Bia00] the
maximum possible throughput is 9,130,00 bps (0.83 * 11 Mbps), two orders of magnitude better
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♦   VPN Off 
■   VPN On 
—Linear (VPN On) 
—Linear (VPN Off) 
Client Distance (ft.) 
Figure 4.3 File Size Impact Graph
performance than the tested system. The transfer program was examined to understand its impact
on throughput. This is the Microsoft supplied program for transfering files onto Pocket PCs via
Winsock. While the code was changed slightly, the changes only affected the visual GUI of the
program and the data recording. These changes do not affect the throughput. The data recording
is done only on the server size, after receipt of the acknowlogement from the client and before
another file is sent. In order to compare the performance of the Pocket PC O/S to the Windows
200 O/S, the program is compiled using Visual Basic Studio, as opposed to the native Embedded
Visual Basic Studio. System call names and other O/S environment information was changed.
Again, these changes should not affect the throughput. When running a Windows 2000 laptop,
the transfer program achieved data rates up to 2.22 Mbps, much closer to Bianchi’s maximum
(cf., Appendix D). Testing conducted by the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research
on wireless networks (without PDAs) show laptop throughput values of up to 5 Mbps with VPN
implementation decreasing that value by 7% [Cus01]. This information indicates that while the
transfer program could be more efficient, it is not responsible for the low throughput values on
the PDA. It should be noted that the laptop had the same network hardware configured with the
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File Size (KB) 
same setup as the PDA. Investigation of the Pocket PC O/S through Microsoft’s website, points
to information on its limitations. This O/S is an extremely scaled-down version of the Windows
operating system. The system calls are not as varied or usable as in Windows. The Winsock
controls are particularly coarse and inefficient. User created Winsock controls are suggested as
a solution in [Vic02], stating a 200% performance increase in his implementation. Another O/S
limitation is in multi-tasking ability. The Pocket PC has no multi-tasking capability, there is no
way to work on one task while another task is waiting for an event to occur. The PDA memory
and processor constraints also contribute to inefficient data transfer.
4.2 Battery Life Experiment Results
This section provides the results of the battery life duration testing. Table 4.22 gives a
summary of the data results. The combinations represent each PDA and jacket combination tested.
The mean is the average amount of time the PDA and jacket combination lasted. The standard
deviation and coefficient of variance (C.O.V.) describe the spread of the observed values around the
mean. A 90% confidence interval of the mean is also given. The standard deviation is calculated by
taking the square root of the following: the number of replications times the sum of each observed
throughput squared minus the square of the sum of all the observed throughput all divided by the
number of replications times the number of replications minus one.
Table 4.22 Battery Life duration Results
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION C.O.V. 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
COMBINATION min min min
1 163.70 11.75 0.0718 (155.05, 172.34)
2 145.11 2.51 0.0173 (143.26, 146.96)
3 179.83 3.81 0.0212 (177.02, 182.64)
4 169.10 4.19 0.0248 (166.02, 172.18)
Overall 164.44 14.27 0.0868 (159.19, 169.68)
The overall mean duration of the PDA and jacket combination is 164.44 minutes. With a
90% confidence, any given combination should last from 159.19 to 169.68 minutes. Examining the
Constant Use Battery Life Testing tables in [Vin01], it is apparent that the jacket battery provides
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50-66% of the PDA and jacket combination’s duration. The shorter the duration, the higher the
percentage that the jacket contributes. Since the observed mean life duration is shorter than all
cases provided in [Vin01], it is safe to assume that the jacket provides at least 60% of the duration
in this testing. Extra jackets will provide about 98.6 additional minutes of power.
4.3 Summary
This chapter provides the data observed from hardware testing. Data is analyzed and sum-
marized to provide useful information on the performance of the system. The throughput effects of
the various factor levels are determined and presented as a ratio to the overall mean throughput.
The system is analyzed independently with the VPN off and on, those cases are compared, and a
combined analysis is presented. The data shows a mean throughput value of 11,815 bps for the VPN
off tests and 11,391 bps for the VPN on tests. These values are much lower than anticipated, but
the VPN effect is small. The client distance impact is nearly negligible, while file size had a small
impact on performance. The battery life duration results are given and analyzed, the PDA/jacket
combination has a duration of around 164 minutes.
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V. Conclusions
The research significance is explained in this chapter. Results are summarized and a conclusion is
given. Some implications and research impact is provided along with recommendations for possible
topics of further research in this area.
5.1 Results
Results detailed in Chapter IV are given here in concise summarized form. The throughput
experiment and battery life experiment are discussed separately.
5.1.1 Throughput Experiment. Results of the throughput experiment are summarized in
Tables 5.1 and 5.2. To demonstrate the impact of the factor levels, the percentage of the effect of
each factor level to the overall mean throughput is given. Per Table 5.1, the mean throughput of
the VPN off tests is 11,815 bps and 11,391 bps for the VPN on tests, representing a 3.59% decrease
in performance when the VPN is on. Per Table 5.2, the impact of the file size and client distance is
small, ≤ 3%. The impact from varying factor levels is greater in the VPN on tests than the VPN
off, due to higher overhead and messaging requirements.
5.1.2 Battery Life Experiment. The battery life of the PDA and jacket battery combina-
tion (two PDAs and two jackets)is observed to be about 164 minutes on average, with additional
Table 5.1 Throughput Comparison
Test Cases: Mean 1, 10 2, 11 3, 12 4, 13
VPN Off 11,815 12,138 11,750 11,674 12,028
VPN On 11,391 11,749 11,438 11,226 11,645
Percent Decrease 3.59% 3.21% 2.66% 3.84% 3.19%
Test Cases: 5, 4 6, 15 7, 16 8, 17 9, 18
VPN Off 11,767 11,605 11,976 11,752 11,639
VPN On 11,348 11,192 11,670 11,279 10,972
Percent Decrease 3.56% 3.55% 2.55% 4.03% 5.74%
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Table 5.2 Factor Impact
CLIENT DISTANCE FILE SIZE
CLOSE TYPICAL FAR SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
VPN OFF 0.33% -0.12% -0.21% 1.97% -0.49% -1.48%
VPN ON 0.70% 0.04% -0.74% 2.61% -0.32% -2.29%
jackets adding about 99 minutes each. The tested conditions represent constant network traffic
over the wireless link. Less excessive use of the wireless link would result in longer battery life.
5.2 Conclusion
Research results indicate very poor performance of a Wireless Local Area Network utilizing
PDAs. Of the three factors (client distance, file size, and VPN), the throughput is effected most by
the VPN implementation and slightly by increased file size. The client distance factor has virtually
no effect on throughput. The impact of each of these factor levels is small when compared to
the magnitude of the overall mean throughput (≤ 6%). The average throughput of the network
with the PDA client is much lower than expected, ≈ 11,500 bps versus 9,130,00 bps provided
by the analytical model [Bia00]. This is attributed to several factors, with degradation primarily
resulting from limitations of the PDA hardware and O/S. Because of the low throughput values
achieved (regardless if VPN is off or on), an operational WLAN with PDAs (as tested) is not
feasible. Operational use of the network tested would require an in-depth analysis of the type
of network traffic and performance required to maintain functionality. To deploy such a system,
custom designed Winsock controls would need to be implemented to minimize limitations imposed
by the PDA. As PDA technology continues to develop, future hardware and O/S functionality may
provide a more robust platform for network communications. The battery life duration was a little
shorter than anticipated. This is likely due to the fact that the wireless network card adapter
requires more power than the average PC card tested by Compaq [Vin01].
Research into the Winsock implementation and network communications for the Pocket PC
operating system could prove very beneficial. It is expected that a more optimized communication
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method can improve the throughput drastically. A Windows 2000 implementation of the client
software (cf., Appendix D) with more robust Winsock controls improved the throughput by two
orders-of-magnitude. Another interesting area of study would be in environmental effects. Terrain,
buildings, weather, etc. impact analysis would provide a comprehensive understanding of the PDAs
capabilities in various situations. Because of an observed lack of impact due to client distance in
this research, further studies into range limitations should be conducted.
5.3 Summary
The effect of the VPN implementation on this network is small, but significant. The effect
from the file size and client distance are smaller than the effect from the VPN, in fact the effect
from client distance was almost negligible. Overall, the PDA client’s throughput rates, ≈ 11500
bps, are not comparable to those of a laptop computer, 2,220,000 bps. The PDA operating system
and environment proved to be the limiting factor in the performance of this wireless local area
network. The life duration of the PDA and jacket combination was determined to be about 164
minutes, with additional jackets adding about 99 more minutes.
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Appendix A. Transfer Program Code
A.1 Introduction
The basic transfer program used in testing was obtained from the Microsoft website at:
http://support.microsoft.com/directory/article.asp?ID=KB;EN-US;Q275004. This program was
designed to transfer bitmap files to a Pocket PC PDA via Winsocket. The program was slightly
modified to incorporate requirements for this research, such as custom GUI and data logging.
A.2 Server Side Code
The code for the server side version of the transfer program is included below. The code is in
Visual Basic and was edited using Visual Basic Studio 6.0. The file server.vbp is the Visual Basic
Project file which basically provides header information. The file server.frm is the Visual Basic





















































































































































































































Attribute VB_Name = "Form1"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Option Explicit
Private Const WS_VERSION_REQD = &H101
Private Const WS_VERSION_MAJOR = WS_VERSION_REQD \ &H100 And &HFF&
Private Const WS_VERSION_MINOR = WS_VERSION_REQD And &HFF&
Private Const MIN_SOCKETS_REQD = 1
Private Const SOCKET_ERROR = -1
Private Const WSADescription_Len = 256
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Private Const WSASYS_Status_Len = 128
Dim timecount As Long ’ time count in 10 millisecond increments
Dim trate As Long ’ computed data transfer rate
Dim bsmallData() As Byte ’ small data packet to send
Dim blargeData() As Byte ’ large data packet to send
Dim dataheader() As Byte
Dim ismallsize As Long ’ size of small data packet to send
Dim ilargesize As Long ’ size of large data packet to send
Dim isize As Long ’ size of data packet for current test
Dim sdata As String ’ received control information from hand held
Dim sdata2 As String
Dim isendrate As Long ’ computed data transfer rate
Dim itrate2 As Long
Dim ismallsum As Long ’ sum of the data s set
Dim ilargesum As Long ’ sum of the data l set
Dim isum As Long
Dim iwitchtest As Integer
Dim afilename As String
Dim iwait As Integer
Dim iwait2 As Integer
Dim istop As Integer
Dim ATEMP As String
Dim ATEMP2 As String
Dim createdata As Integer
Dim idataset As Integer
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Dim ndatasets As Long
Dim nospeeddata As Integer
Dim ticktemp As Long
Dim tickstart As Long
Dim tickmiddle As Long
Dim tickstop As Long
Dim tickfirstrecv As Long
Dim tickrecvdone As Long
Dim igettick As Integer
Dim iget1tick As Integer
Dim iget2tick As Integer
Dim firstack As Integer











szDescription(0 To WSADescription_Len) As Byte
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Private Declare Function WSAGetLastError Lib "WSOCK32.DLL" () As Long
Private Declare Function GetTickCount Lib "kernel32" () As Long
Private Declare Function WSAStartup Lib "WSOCK32.DLL" ( _
ByVal wVersionRequired As Long, _
lpWSAData As WSADATA) As Long
Private Declare Function WSACleanup Lib "WSOCK32.DLL" () As Long
Private Declare Function gethostname Lib "WSOCK32.DLL" ( _
ByVal hostname As String, _
ByVal HostLen As Long) As Long
Private Declare Function gethostbyname Lib "WSOCK32.DLL" ( _
ByVal hostname As String) As Long
Private Declare Sub RtlMoveMemory Lib "kernel32" ( _
hpvDest As Any, _
ByVal hpvSource As Long, _
ByVal cbCopy As Long)
Private Function hibyte(ByVal wParam As Integer)
hibyte = wParam \ &H100 And &HFF&
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End Function
Private Function lobyte(ByVal wParam As Integer)













iget1tick = 0 ’ set iget1tick =0 so only tick at first winsock2 "10" is recorded
If ndatasets > 1 Then blargeData(ilargesize - 1) = CByte(20)
tickstart = GetTickCount()
If ndatasets > 1 Then















Rem small data set send continusly
Close #1
Open Text1 For Append As #1
Text1.Enabled = False
istop = 0
Do While istop = 0
disable_all_buttons






iget1tick = 0 ’ set iget1tick =0 so only tick at first winsock2 "10" is recorded
If ndatasets > 1 Then bsmallData(ismallsize - 1) = CByte(20)
tickstart = GetTickCount()
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If ndatasets > 1 Then




bsmallData(ismallsize - 1) = CByte(0)
End If
Label3.Caption = "before send" + Str(GetTickCount())
Winsock2.SendData bsmallData()
Label3.Caption = "before iwait" + Str(GetTickCount())




Label3.Caption = "before iwait2" + Str(GetTickCount())
Timer2 = True
















Rem large data continuous send
istop = 0
Close #1
Open Text1 For Append As #1
Text1.Enabled = False
Do While istop = 0
disable_all_buttons






iget1tick = 0 ’ set iget1tick =0 so only tick at first winsock2 "10" is recorded
If ndatasets > 1 Then blargeData(ilargesize - 1) = CByte(20)
tickstart = GetTickCount()
If ndatasets > 1 Then





blargeData(ilargesize - 1) = CByte(0)
End If
Label3.Caption = "before send" + Str(GetTickCount())
Winsock2.SendData blargeData()
Label3.Caption = "before iwait" + Str(GetTickCount())




Label3.Caption = "before iwait2" + Str(GetTickCount())
Timer2 = True










Rem Stop Cont or stop test so you can do other tests
If iwitchtest <> 5 And iwitchtest <> 6 Then
command1.Enabled = False ’connect
Command2.Enabled = True ’ send small
Command3.Enabled = True ’ disconnect
Command4.Enabled = True ’ send large
Command5.Enabled = True ’ send small cont
Command6.Enabled = True ’ send large cont








If Len(Dir1) < 4 Then
Text1 = Dir1 + afilename
Else






If Len(Dir1) < 4 Then
Text1 = Dir1 + afilename
Else





If Len(Dir1) < 4 Then
Text1 = Dir1 + afilename
Else




Dim i As Long
Dim j As Integer
Dim isum As Long
Dim ibyte As Byte
ATEMP = ""





ndatasets = 1 ’ 390
createdata = 1 ’ if createdata =1 then create test data
iwait = 0 ’ iwait =0 data has been sent iwait=1 data is sending
istop = 0 ’ istop =0 let loop run istop =1 stop the loop




If Len(Dir1) < 4 Then
Text1 = Dir1 + afilename
Else







Command2.Caption = "Send Small"
Command3.Caption = "Close Connections"
Command4.Caption = "Send Large"
Command5.Caption = "Send sm Cont"
Command6.Caption = "Send lg Cont"








Timer1.Interval = 10 ’ Set interval of rate measuring timer




If createdata = 0 Then
’ load small data packet
ismallsum = 0
Open "smdata.dat" For Binary Access Read As #1
For i = 1 To 20
Get #1, i, dataheader(i - 1) ’ get size and sum info
Next i
For i = 1 To 9
sdata = sdata + Chr(dataheader(i - 1)) ’seprate size info
Next i
ismallsize = Val(sdata)
ReDim bsmallData(ismallsize - 1)
sdata = ""
For i = 10 To 19
A-21




For i = 1 To ismallsize
Get #1, i + 20, ibyte ’ load small test data
isum = isum + ibyte
bsmallData(i - 1) = ibyte
Next i
Close #1
’ get large data
Open "lgdata.dat" For Binary Access Read As #1
For i = 1 To 20
Get #1, i, dataheader(i - 1) ’ get size and sum info
Next i
sdata = ""
For i = 1 To 9
sdata = sdata + Chr(dataheader(i - 1)) ’seprate size info
Next i
ilargesize = Val(sdata)
ReDim blargeData(ilargesize - 1)
sdata = ""
For i = 10 To 19





For i = 1 To ilargesize
Get #1, i + 20, ibyte ’ load small test data
isum = isum + ibyte




ReDim bsmallData(ismallsize - 1)












Rem Winsock3.LocalPort = 6000
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Rem Winsock3.RemotePort = 6001







Rem small data set send
Dim bytessent As Long
Dim bytesremaining As Long
Dim test As String
Dim i As Long
Dim j As Integer
disable_all_buttons ’ call disable_all_buttons
Open Text1 For Append As #1
isum = (ismallsum + 20) * (ndatasets - 1) + ismallsum
isize = ismallsize
iwitchtest = 2
iwait = 1 ’ setup to wait until hand held has send final acknowledgement
timecount = 0
igettick = 0 ’ set igettick =0 so only tick at first responce is recorded
iget1tick = 0 ’ set iget1tick =0 so only tick at first winsock2 "10" is recorded
A-24
iget2tick = 0 ’ set iget1tick =0 so only tick at first winsock2 "20" is recorded
If ndatasets > 1 Then bsmallData(ismallsize - 1) = CByte(20)
tickstart = GetTickCount()
Rem Timer1.Enabled = True
If ndatasets > 1 Then





















command1.Enabled = True ’connect
Command2.Enabled = False ’ send small
Command3.Enabled = False ’ disconnect
Command4.Enabled = False ’ send large
Command5.Enabled = False ’ send small cont
Command6.Enabled = False ’ send large cont
Command7.Enabled = False ’ stop send
End Sub
Private Sub Text1_Change()
Dim ATEMP As String
Dim l1 As Integer
Dim l2 As Integer
Rem If Len(Dir1) < 4 Then
Rem ATEMP = Dir1
Rem Else
Rem ATEMP = Dir1
Rem End If
A-26
Rem l1 = Len(ATEMP)
Rem l2 = Len(Text1)
Rem afilename = Right(Text1, l2 - l1 - 1)
End Sub
Private Sub Timer1_Timer()





Private Sub Winsock1_ConnectionRequest(ByVal requestID As Long)
Winsock2.Accept requestID
command1.Enabled = False ’connect
Command2.Enabled = True ’ send small
Command3.Enabled = True ’ disconnect
Command4.Enabled = True ’ send large
Command5.Enabled = True ’ send small cont
Command6.Enabled = True ’ send large cont
Command7.Enabled = False ’ stop send




Dim WSAD As WSADATA
Dim iReturn As Integer
Dim sLowByte As String, sHighByte As String, sMsg As String
iReturn = WSAStartup(WS_VERSION_REQD, WSAD)
If iReturn <> 0 Then
MsgBox "Winsock.dll is not responding."
End
End If
If lobyte(WSAD.wversion) < WS_VERSION_MAJOR Or _
(lobyte(WSAD.wversion) = _
WS_VERSION_MAJOR And hibyte(WSAD.wversion) < WS_VERSION_MINOR) Then
sHighByte = Trim$(Str$(hibyte(WSAD.wversion)))
sLowByte = Trim$(Str$(lobyte(WSAD.wversion)))
sMsg = "Windows Sockets version " & sLowByte & "." & sHighByte




’iMaxSockets is not used in Winsock 2, so the following check is only
’necessary for Winsock 1. If Winsock 2 is requested,
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’the following check can be skipped.
If WSAD.iMaxSockets < MIN_SOCKETS_REQD Then
sMsg = "This application requires a minimum of "














GetWinsockState = "Connection pending"
Case 4 ’sckResolvingHost
GetWinsockState = "Resolving host"
Case 5 ’sckHostResolved












Private Function GetHostIP() As String
Dim sHostName As String * 256
Dim lHostEnt_Addr As Long
Dim Host As HOSTENT
Dim lHostIP_Addr As Long
Dim bTempIP_Addr() As Byte
Dim i As Integer
Dim sIP_Addr As String
If gethostname(sHostName, 256) = SOCKET_ERROR Then







If lHostEnt_Addr = 0 Then
MsgBox "Winsock.dll is not responding."
Exit Function
End If
RtlMoveMemory Host, lHostEnt_Addr, LenB(Host)
RtlMoveMemory lHostIP_Addr, Host.hAddrList, 4
’Get all of the IP addresses if the computer is multi-homed.
Do
ReDim bTempIP_Addr(1 To Host.hLength)
RtlMoveMemory bTempIP_Addr(1), lHostIP_Addr, Host.hLength
For i = 1 To Host.hLength
sIP_Addr = sIP_Addr & bTempIP_Addr(i) & "."
Next
sIP_Addr = Mid$(sIP_Addr, 1, Len(sIP_Addr) - 1)
GetHostIP = sIP_Addr
sIP_Addr = ""
Host.hAddrList = Host.hAddrList + LenB(Host.hAddrList)
RtlMoveMemory lHostIP_Addr, Host.hAddrList, 4




Dim lReturn As Long
lReturn = WSACleanup()
If lReturn <> 0 Then
MsgBox "Socket error " & Trim$(Str$(lReturn)) & _




Private Sub Winsock2_DataArrival(ByVal bytesTotal As Long)
If igettick = 0 Then ticktemp = GetTickCount: igettick = 1
Winsock2.GetData sdata
ATEMP = ATEMP + sdata
ATEMP2 = Right(sdata, 1)
If ATEMP2 = "Z" Then ’ when we get the Z we have gotten all the
data back form the client
sdata = Left(ATEMP, Len(ATEMP) - 1) ’ chop off end 0
ATEMP = ""
If Right(sdata, 1) = "1" Then ’ get time to recieve data
tickstop = ticktemp
ctime = Val(Left(sdata, Len(sdata) - 1)) ’ get time to recieve data
Rem itrate2 = isize * ndatasets * 1000 / ctime
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Winsock2.SendData Str(tickmiddle - tickstart) +
" " + Str(ctime) + " " + Str(tickstop - tickstart
- ctime) + Chr(0) ’ send out the transmit speed
Print #1, Time, tickmiddle - tickstart, ctime, tickstop -
tickstart - ctime, tickstop - tickstart
End If
If sdata = "2" Then Command2_Click ’ send small
If sdata = "3" Then Command3_Click
If sdata = "4" Then Command4_Click ’ send large
If sdata = "5" Then Command5_Click ’ send small cont
If sdata = "6" Then Command6_Click ’ send large cont
If sdata = "7" Then ’ stop sending data
Command7_Click




If Right(sdata, 1) = "8" Then ’ change name command
afilename = Left(sdata, Len(sdata) - 1)
If Len(Dir1) < 4 Then
Text1 = Dir1 + afilename
Else





If sdata = "9" Then ’ final acknowledgement
tickstop = ticktemp
Rem ctime = Val(Left(sdata, Len(sdata) - 1)) ’ get time to recieve data
Print #1, Time, tickstop - tickstart




Private Sub Winsock2_Error(ByVal Number As Integer, Description As String,
ByVal Scode As Long, ByVal Source As String, ByVal HelpFile As String,





Rem If idataset = ndatasets Then Timer1.Enabled = False: tickstop =
GetTickCount(): Text1.Text = Str(tickstop - tickstart)
If idataset = ndatasets Then tickmiddle = GetTickCount(): timecount
= Str(tickmiddle - tickstart)
If nospeeddata = 0 Then
isendrate = 1000
Else
Rem If idataset = ndatasets Then isendrate = (isize * ndatasets /
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timecount) * 100




If iwitchtest = 2 Then Command2.Enabled = True
If iwitchtest = 4 Then Command4.Enabled = True
Command7.Enabled = True
Command3.Enabled = True
If idataset = ndatasets Then idataset = 0
End Sub
Sub create_data()
Dim i As Long
Dim j As Integer
ismallsum = 0
For i = 1 To ismallsize - 1
j = Int(Rnd() * 245) + 10
ismallsum = ismallsum + j
bsmallData(i - 1) = CByte(j)
Next i
bsmallData(ismallsize - 1) = 0
ilargesum = 0
For i = 1 To ilargesize - 1
j = Int(Rnd() * 245) + 10
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ilargesum = ilargesum + j
blargeData(i - 1) = CByte(j)
Next i
blargeData(ilargesize - 1) = 0
End Sub





command1.Enabled = False ’connect
Command2.Enabled = False ’ send small
Command3.Enabled = False ’ disconnect
Command4.Enabled = False ’ send large
Command5.Enabled = False ’ send small cont
Command6.Enabled = False ’ send large cont





command1.Enabled = False ’connect
Command2.Enabled = True ’ send small
Command3.Enabled = True ’ disconnect
Command4.Enabled = True ’ send large
Command5.Enabled = True ’ send small cont
Command6.Enabled = True ’ send large cont
Command7.Enabled = False ’ stop send
Text1.Enabled = True
End Sub
Private Sub Winsock3_ConnectionRequest(ByVal requestID As Long)
If Winsock3.State <> sckClosed Then
Winsock3.Close
End If




Private Sub Winsock3_DataArrival(ByVal bytesTotal As Long)
Winsock3.GetData sdata2
If iget1tick = 0 Then
tickfirstrecv = GetTickCount()
Label2.Caption = sdata2 + Str(tickfirstrecv)
End If
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Rem If iget2tick = 0 And sdata2 = "20" Then
Rem tickrecvdone = GetTickCount()
Rem Label2.Caption = sdata2 + Str(tickrecvdone)
Rem End If
End Sub
A.3 Client Side Code
The code for the client side version of the transfer program is included below. The code is in
Embedded Visual Basic and was edited using Embedded Visual Basic Studio 3.0. The file client.ebp
is the Embedded Visual Basic Project file which basically provides header information. The file
client.bas provides some basic functions that are used by the client.ebf file. The file client.ebf is the
















































Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Option Explicit
Public Declare Function CreateFile Lib "Coredll" Alias "CreateFileW" ( _
ByVal lpFileName As String, _
ByVal dwDesiredAccess As Long, _
ByVal dwShareMode As Long, _
lpSecurityAttributes As Long, _
ByVal dwCreationDisposition As Long, _
ByVal dwFlagsAndAttributes As Long, _
ByVal hTemplateFile As Long) As Long
Public Declare Function ReadFile Lib "Coredll" ( _
ByVal hFile As Long, _
ByVal lpBuffer As String, _
A-40
ByVal nNumberOfBytesToRead As Long, _
lpNumberOfBytesRead As Long, _
ByVal lpOverlapped As Long) As Long
Public Declare Function WriteFile Lib "Coredll" ( _
ByVal hFile As Long, _
ByVal lpBuffer As String, _
ByVal nNumberOfBytesToWrite As Long, _
lpNumberOfBytesWritten As Long, _
ByVal lpOverlapped As Long) As Long
Public Declare Function CloseHandle Lib "Coredll" ( _
ByVal hObject As Long) As Long
Public Declare Function GetLastError Lib "Coredll" () As Long
Public Declare Function LoadCursor Lib "Coredll" _
Alias "LoadCursorW" ( _
ByVal hInstance As Long, _
ByVal lpCursorName As Long) As Long
Public Declare Function SetCursor Lib "Coredll" ( _
ByVal hCursor As Long) As Long
Public Const READ_CONTROL = &H20000
Public Const READ_WRITE = 2
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Public Const FILE_READ_DATA = (&H1)
Public Const FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES = (&H80)
Public Const FILE_READ_EA = (&H8)
Public Const FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES = (&H100)
Public Const FILE_WRITE_DATA = (&H2)
Public Const FILE_WRITE_EA = (&H10)
Public Const FILE_APPEND_DATA = (&H4)
Public Const SYNCHRONIZE = &H100000
Public Const CREATE_ALWAYS = 2
Public Const OPEN_EXISTING = 3
Public Const OPEN_ALWAYS = 4
Public Const STANDARD_RIGHTS_WRITE = &H20000
Public Const STANDARD_RIGHTS_READ = &H20000
Public Const GENERIC_READ = &H80000000
Public Const GENERIC_WRITE = &H40000000
Public Const IDC_WAIT = 32514
Public Function WaitCursor(bWait As Boolean) As Long
Dim hCursor As Long
’Obtain the handle to the cursor.
If bWait Then
’Get handle to the wait cursor.




hCursor = LoadCursor(0, 0)
End If





Object = "{23CE4CF5-25A1-11D1-9A72-00A0C986B84A}#1.0#0"; "mscewinsock.dll"
Begin VB.Form Form1



























































Underline = 0 ’False
Italic = 0 ’False






HideSelection = -1 ’True
Locked = 0 ’False
MaxLength = 0





















Caption = "change name"
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HideSelection = -1 ’True
Locked = 0 ’False
MaxLength = 0
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Caption = "Send lg cont"
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Caption = "Send sm cont"
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Caption = "Send mid cont"
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Caption = "Send Small"
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UseMnemonic = -1 ’True
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Attribute VB_Name = "Form1"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Option Explicit
Dim ireccount As Integer
Dim irecvcount As Integer
Dim inBytes() As Byte
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Dim MyString As String
Dim bLast As Boolean
Dim bNotFirst As Boolean
Dim hFile As Long
Dim iwitchtest As Integer
Dim iwait As Integer
Dim aremotehost As String
Dim itestdata As Integer
Dim atempstring As String
Dim i As Long
Dim isum As Long
Dim winsockerror As Integer
Dim winsocktest As Integer
Dim msg As String
Dim ibytecount As Long
Dim dataset As Integer
Declare Function GetTickCount Lib "Coredll" () As Long





Label1.Caption = "port setup"
WinSock1.LocalPort = 5150
WinSock1.RemotePort = 5149
Rem WinSock2.LocalPort = 6001
Rem WinSock2.RemotePort = 6000
aremotehost = Text2
Label1.Caption = "ip setup"
WinSock1.RemoteHost = aremotehost ’Put your IP address here
Rem WinSock2.RemoteHost = aremotehost



























































If iwait = 0 Then





Rem change data file name
Dim atemp As String




msg = String(18, Chr(0))
winsocktest = 0
Timer1.Interval = 1000





























Private Sub WinSock1_DataArrival(ByVal bytesTotal As Long)
Command7.Enabled = False
ReDim inBytes(bytesTotal)
Dim tickstart As Long
Dim tickstop As Long
iwait = 1
irecvcount = irecvcount + 1
Do While WinSock1.BytesReceived > 0
WinSock1.GetData inBytes, (vbByte + vbArray)
ireccount = ireccount + 1
Rem Label1.Caption = CStr(ireccount)
Rem For i = 1 To UBound(inBytes) + 1
Rem ibytecount = ibytecount + 1
Rem isum = isum + inBytes(i - 1)
Rem Next i
Rem iwait = iwait
Loop
If inBytes(UBound(inBytes)) = 0 Then




dataset = dataset + 1
iwait = 0
If iwitchtest = 2 Then Command2.Enabled = True
If iwitchtest = 4 Then Command4.Enabled = True





WinSock1.SendData "9Z" ’ send final acknowledgement
End If






























Private Sub WinSock1_Error(ByVal number As Long, ByVal description As String)
winsockerror = 111










Dim PM_Remove As Integer
Label1.Caption = "IN do events"
PM_Remove = 1





Private Sub WinSock1_SendProgress(ByVal bytesSent As Long, ByVal bytesRemaining As Long)
End Sub
Private Sub WinSock2_DataArrival(ByVal bytesTotal As Long)
End Sub
A-65
Appendix B. VPN-1 Configuration
The VPN-1/Firewall-1 [Ltd00] server software tested was version 4.1. The following steps were
used to install and setup the software:
1) The autorun program from Checkpoint’s VPN-1/Firewall-1 installation disk was used to
install the server software. All installation options were left at the default values.
2) Then the network objects were defined.
a) The server was added as a gateway, with FWZ, Checkpoint’s native encryption algorithm,
selected. The gateway interface was set as external, to allow communication with the external,
mobile client.
b) The PDA client was added, again with FWZ encryption enabled.
3) The policy was installed. Using the policy manager, a policy consisting of a single rule was
created. This rule required all traffic in the network to be encrypted.
4) The client program was installed via the USB port to a laptop computer. Installation
options were left at default values. Once installed, the gateway object was defined, establishing a
relationship.
5) Once the server and client software was properly installed, the transfer program was ran
to get the test data.
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Appendix C. Raw Data
C.1 Introduction
The raw data recorded from the throughput and battery life experiments are included below.
C.2 Throughput
The data from the throughput experiment is in the following format:




















































































































































































































































































































Table C-1 contains the data from the battery life experiment.
Table C.1 Battery Life est Data
Combination
Test 1 2 3 4
1 Start 11:52:28 AM 12:42:26 PM 9:08:40 AM 3:39:21 PM
Stop 2:48:21 PM 3:10:33 PM 12:08:35 PM 6:34:29 PM
2 Start 2:07:27 PM 8:42:56 AM 3:48:43 PM 10:36:15 AM
Stop 4:39:55 PM 11:04:57 AM 6:44:59 PM 1:26:45 PM
3 Start 11:34:13 AM 3:57:23 PM 12:17:08 PM 8:31:25 AM
Stop 2:04:04 PM 6:24:38 PM 3:20:52 PM 11:16:19 AM
4 Start 2:46:23 PM 12:56:26 PM 8:53:02 AM 9:10:08 AM
Stop 5:35:20 PM 3:20:24 PM 11:48:46 AM 11:55:30 AM
5 Start 12:40:08 PM 8:46:25 AM 4:24:09 PM 3:42:19 PM
Stop 3:31:29 PM 11:10:38 AM 7:27:39 PM 6:31:55 PM
C-14
Appendix D. Laptop Performance
The results for test cases 1-9 ran on a Gateway 2000 Solo laptop computer are given in this
Appendix. The same tables presented in Chapter 4 are provided. The PDA client transfer program
was used, with slight modifications for the Windows 2000 environment (see Appendix A).
Table D.1 Laptop Results
MEAN STANDARD DEV. C.O.V. 90% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
Test bps bps bps
1 1377975 154343 0.112 (1312425, 1443524)
2 1634635 105482 0.065 (1589837, 1679433)
3 1609249 94506 0.059 (1569112, 1649385)
4 1999997 13 0.000 (1999991, 2000002)
5 2211151 29813 0.013 (2198489, 2223813)
6 2193080 45943 0.021 (2173568, 2212592)
7 1947317 99068 0.051 (1905243, 1989391)
8 2113963 89114 0.042 (2076116, 2151809)
9 2117460 56927 0.027 (2093284, 2141636)
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Table D.2 Laptop Computation of Effects
all values bps CLOSE MIDDLE FAR ROW MEAN ROW EFFECT
SMALL 1377975 1999997 1947317 1775096 -136551
MEDIUM 1634635 2211151 2113963 1986583 74935
LARGE 1609249 2211151 2113963 1986583 61616
COLUMN MEAN 1540619 2134742 2059580 1911647
COLUMN EFFECT -371028 223095 147933
Table D.3 Laptop Interactions
all values bps CLOSE MIDDLE FAR
SMALL -26094 1805 24288
MEDIUM 19080 1473 -20553
LARGE 7014 -3279 -3735
Table D.4 Laptop ANOVA
COMPONENT SoS PoV DoF MS F-C F-T
ALL MEANS 505007561415366 135
MEAN RESPONSE 493343362377749 1
ALL MEANS -
MEAN RESPONSE 11664199037617 100 134
CLIENT DISTANCE 9419278645526 81 2 4709639322763 624 ≈2.4
WORKLOAD 1262612074586 11 2 631306037293 84 ≈2.4
INTERACTIONS 32048631725 0 4 8012157931 13.91 ≈2.1
ERRORS 950259685781 8 126 8012157931 1
Standard Deviation for Errors = 10.26
Table D.5 Laptop Confidence Intervals for Effects
all values bps MEAN STANDARD CONFIDENCE
EFFECT DEVIATION INTERVAL
MEAN 1911647 7474.27 (1899352, 1923942)
CLOSE -371028 10570.22 (-3884160, -35363)
MIDDLE 223095 10570.22 (205737, 240483)
FAR 1479334 10570.22 (130545, 165321)
SMALL -136551 10570.22 (-1539393, -119163)
MEDIUM 74935 10570.22 (57547, 92323)
LARGE 61616 10570.22 (44228, 79004)
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Table D.6 Laptop Client Distance Impact
CLOSE MIDDLE FAR
EFFECT -371028 ± 12295 bps 2230950 ± 12295 bps 147933 ± 12295 bps
IMPACT -19.41% 11.67% 7.74%
Mean Throughput = 1911647 bps
Table D.7 Laptop Workload Impact
SMALL MEDIUM LARGE
EFFECT -136551 ± 12295 bps 74935 ± 12295 bps 61616 ± 12295 bps
IMPACT -7.14% 3.92% 3.22%
Mean Throughput = 1911647 bps
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